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OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of

Sandu Margarit Smarandache

Application No. 10/785,058

Filed: February 25, 2004 Attorney Docket No. 93217-1 ON PETITION

Attorney Docket No. 93217-1

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), filed March 21, 2005, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) is **DISMISSED**.

Any request for reconsideration or petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extension of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Renewed Petition Under 37 CFR 1.137(a)." This is **not** a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C § 704.

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to reply to the Notice to File Missing Parts of Non-provisional Application mailed May 18, 2004, which set a period for reply of two (2) months from its mailing date. Extensions of time for reply pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) was available. A proper response was not received within the allowed period, and the application became abandoned on July 18, 2004. A Notice of Abandonment was mailed on February 9, 2005.

A grantable petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)¹ must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply,² unless previously filed; (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(1); (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unavoidable; and (4) any terminal disclaimer required by 37 CFR 1.137(c).

As amended effective December 1, 1997. See Changes to Patent Practice and Procedure; Final Rule Notice 62 Fed. Reg. 53131, 53194-95 (October 10, 1997), 1203 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 63, 119-20 (October 21, 1997).

² In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof.

The instant petition lacks items (3).

The Commissioner is responsible for determining the standard for unavoidable delay and for applying that standard.

"In the specialized field of patent law, . . . the Commissioner of Patent and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the application and enforcement of the various narrow and technical statutory and regulatory provisions. The Commissioner's interpretation of those provisions is entitled to considerable deference."

"[T]he Commissioner's discretion cannot remain wholly uncontrolled, if the facts **clearly** demonstrate that the applicant's delay in prosecuting the application was unavoidable, and that the Commissioner's adverse determination lacked **any** basis in reason or common sense."

"The court's review of a Commissioner's decision is 'limited, however, to a determination of whether the agency finding was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."

"The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."

The standard

"[T]he question of whether an applicant's delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable must be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the facts and circumstances into account." The general question asked by the Office is: "Did petitioner act as a reasonable and prudent person in relation to his most important business?" Nonawarness of a PTO rule will not constitute unavoidable delay.

⁷Id.

³Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F.Supp. 900, 904, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd without opinion (Rule 36), 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir.1991) (citing Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg 849 F.2d 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("an agency" interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference"); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 81 L. Ed. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) ("if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")

⁴Commissariat A L'Energie Atomique et al. v. Watson, 274 F.2d 594, 597, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (emphasis added).

⁵<u>Haines v. Quigg</u>, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S. Ct.1241, 1244 (1973) (citing 5 U.S.C. §706 (2)(A)); Beerly v. Dept. of Treasury, 768 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Mossinghoff, 217 U.S. App. D.C. 27, 671 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir.1982)).

⁶Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608, 34 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 77 L.Ed.2d 443, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983)).

⁸See In re Mattulah, 38 App. D.C. 497 (D.C. Cir. 1912).

Application of the standard to the current facts and circumstances

In the instant petition, petitioner maintains that the circumstances leading to the abandonment of the application meet the aforementioned unavoidable standard and, therefore, petitioner qualifies for relief under 37 CFR 1.137(a). In support thereof, petitioner argues that the inventor did not intend for the application to become abandoned, but was restricted by the attorney of record at the time from reviewing the application file contents.

With regard to item (3) above, the aforementioned argument of petitioner in support of petitioner's belief that the above-cited application was unavoidably abandoned is not persuasive. The reason petitioner's argument must necessarily fail are addressed below.

The record reflects that the Notice to File Missing Parts of Nonprovisional Application Papers was properly mailed to the address of record at the time, and there is no argument made that the notice was not timely received. Accordingly, the inventor's alleged lack of access to the Notice to File Missing Parts of Non-provisional Application cannot be considered a cause for unavoidable delay.

Further, as a matter of course, disputes as to whether or not the assignee of an application will allow the inventor access to the application file will not be addressed by the Office absent a request made pursuant to 37 CFR 1.4(c) to restrict the inventor from accessing the application. A review of the application file did not reveal that an assignment was recorded for this application, nor did it reveal a request pursuant to 37 CFR 1.4(c). The inventor, therefore, had the ability to contact the Office and inquire as to the status of the application and to make changes to the power of attorney, if necessary. Petitioner's failure to exercise this option cannot be considered a cause for unavoidable delay, accordingly.

It is also noted that if there is an assignee that was directing the prosecution of this application at the time of the abandonment, 37 CFR 1.137(a) requires that the actions of all relevant parties, including the assignee, be considered in determining whether the delay in prosecuting the application was unavoidable. Accordingly, the Office would be charged with examining the actions of the assignee relative to the abandonment of the application to determine whether the assignee acted reasonably and prudently in prosecuting the application. Petitioner provides little details other than to say that the purported assignee decided to abandoned the application. If the purported assignee intended to abandon the application, any petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) or (b) would dismissed, as a matter of law. Petitioner is, therefore, cautioned to ascertain the exact

⁹See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D.D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel's nonawarness of PTO rules does not constitute "unavoidable" delay)). Although court decisions have only addressed the issue of lack of knowledge of an attorney, there is no reason to expect a different result due to lack of knowledge on the part of a pro se (one who prosecutes on his own) applicant. It would be inequitable for a court to determine that a client who spends his hard earned money on an attorney who happens not to know a specific rule should be held to a higher standard than a pro se applicant who makes (or is forced to make) the decision to file the application without the assistance of counsel.

circumstances of the purported assignee's abandonment of the application as this will have a direct impact on the disposition of any renewed petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) or a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b).

Petitioner may file a petition to revive the application based on unintentional abandonment under 37 CFR 1.137(b) (enclosed). A grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by the required reply, the required petition fee (\$1,500.00 for a large entity and \$750.00 for a verified small entity), and a statement that the **entire** delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional.

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

By mail:

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United States Patent and Trademark Office

Box 1450

Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

By facsimile:

(703) 872-9306

Attn: Office of Petitions

Telephone inquiries concerning this matter may be directed to the undersigned at (571) 272-3222.

Kenya A. McLaughlin Petitions Attorney Office of Petitions

Enclosure: Form PTO/SB/64

Kenya a. Mefayhlin